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1. INTRODUCTION

This Essay examines the contours of what I have elsewhere
called the new constitutional order! with re~ect to international
human rights and federalism. The background is my suggestion that
the U.S. political-constitutional system is on the verge of moving
into a new constitutional regime, following the end of the New
Deal-Great Society constitutional regime.2 The Supreme Court's
innovations in the law of federalism in connection with Congress's
exercise of its powers over domestic affairs has provoked
tCarmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown
University Law Center. B.A., 1967, Harvard University; M.A., 1971, Yale
University, J.D., 1971, Yale University Law School. I would like to thank L.
Michael Seidman, Peter Spiro, and Carlos Manuel Vazquez for their comments
on a draft of this Essay, and Jacqueline Shapiro for her usual top-notch work as
a research assistant.
1. See Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the
Chastening ofConstitutional A mbition, 113 HARv.1. REV. 29 (1999).
2. For a discussion of the idea of constitutional regimes, and for a brief
description of the New Deal-Great Society regime, see Tushnet, supra note 1, at
34-36. A shorthand description of the concept of constitutional regimes is that
they are reasonably stable sets of political and constitutional arrangements within
which political actors determine policy based on their shared understanding of
the regune's fundamental organizing principles.
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speculation about the implications of those innovations for the
national government's power with respect to foreign affairs. 3 Most
of the speculation has been that the Court is about to-or at least
should-en~age in what I have called projects of restoration and
revolution. That is, the Court will, or should, return to an
understanding of the relation between the nation's power with
respect to foreign affairs that prevailed before the New Deal-Great
Society era.
According to the conventional understanding of the New DealGreat Society order, the national government had essentially
plenary power over an:r matter fairly described as implicating the
nation's foreign affairs. Congress rarely pressed the limits of this
plenary power during the New DeaI-Great Society era,6 but
political actors agreed that Congress had broad power. That
agreement may have conditioned the policy-making environment
by making available for serious consideration proposals that would
involve expansive exercises of power, thereby pushing policybargaining in an internationalist direction. Thus, acknowledging
linuts on Congress's constitutional authority with re~pect to
foreign affairs would not only change dramatically our
understanding of what Congress might do, but might also have real
effects on polIcy outcomes.
I propose in this Essay a more modest perspective on the
relation between the Court's new federalism doctrine and the
constitutional regulation of the nation's conduct of foreign affairs.
Focusing on international human rights, I argue that the Court's
initiatives are likely to be rather small. This chastened ambition, as
I have called it, results in part from the structure of politics in the
current regime, but more from the accumulated weight of
precedent and, even more, from the continuing importance of U.S.
3. Probably the most prominent such speculation is Curtis A. Bradley, The

Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390 (1998)

(ar~ing,

inter alia, that the Court's doctrine dealing with foreign affairs shoUld De
harmonized with its new domestic federaIism doctrine). For additional
discussion, see infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
4. Mark Tushnet, What is the Supreme Court's New Federalism?, 25 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REv. 927 (2000).
5. Another part of the conventional understanding was that within the
national government the President had essentially plenary power with respect to
such matters, even in the face of congressional disagreement. This aspect of the
New Deal-Great Society constitutional order is not a focus of my concern here.
6. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (a
case in which Congress did not exercise its power over foreign commerce to
displace a controversial state tax). This contrasts with its actions in domestic
matters, where it did exercise its powers quite expansively.
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government action in the international order. Section I! of this
essay outlines the place of forei~ affairs in the New Deal-Great
Society constitutional order, and the reasons for thinking that they
will occupy a somewhat different place in the new constitutional
order. Section ill describes some problems where international
human rights and domestic constitutional law intersect. Section IV
then examines the Supreme Court's federalism doctrine and its
application to foreigtl. affairs generally and to the problems
described in the preceding Part.

I!. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS
Harold Koh has described processes by which international
legal norms are incorporated into the domestic legal order? I adapt
his term to describe the incorporation of international poltcy
concerns as well. 8 After such concerns are incorporated and
internalized in the policy-making process, they must be integrated
with the remainder of constitutional law. The conventional
wisdom about the way in which foreign affairs were integrated into
the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order can be easily
stated. The United States came to playa major role in international
affairs, initially in W orId War I! and then as the leader of anticommunist forces during the Cold War.9 A bipartisan consensus
emerged supporting that role as traditionally isolationist segments
of both major parties were displaced. The consensus was that the
new U.S. role required maximum flexibility in developing
international policies.10 The nation's power with respect to foreign
affairs therefore had to be plenary.11 As Martin Flaherty puts it, the
7. See Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L.
REv. 623, 642 (1998) (describing, inter alia, political and legal "internalization"
of international norms).
8. For additional discussion of legal internalization, see text accompanying
notes-infra.
9. For a discussion, see W. Michael Reisman, War Powers: The Operational
Code ofCompetence, 83 AM.J.lNT'LL. ro, 780-83 (1989).
10. For a discussion of the manner in which constitutional doctrine was
transformed, stressing that the process took place over along period and was not
directly connected to the New Deal itself, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 33-93 (2000).
11. Responding in part to Senator Bricker's proposals to amend the
Constitution, the consensus came to accept the proposition that this plenary
power was limited by the Constitution's individUal rights provisions. See Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). For a discussion of the Bncker proposals, see
DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF
EISENHOWER'S POUTICAL LEADERSffiP (1988).
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New Deal, W orId War II, and "the emergence of the Soviet Union
led to a rejection of formalist nineteentli-century understandings,
fostering instead a regime that was executive-centered in terms of
separation of powers, nationalist as a matter of federalism, and
internationalist in general orientation. "12 Formalist doctrines, in
which some matters might be categorically excluded from the
foreign affairs power, were replaced by balancing tests that gave the
government what seemed to be the appropriate degree of
flexibility .13
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, "parochial doctrines
reemerged. Domestically, 'states' rights' is no 10nRer a
segregationist slogan but once again constitutional doctrine." 4 The
declining threat of international crisis removed one source of
nationalIzing pressure. IS In Jack Goldsmith's terms, at least some of
the internatIonal issues currently raisin~ questions of domestic
constitutional law "are from any perspectIve much less significant"
than the ones arising from the Cold War. 16 One of Goldsmith's
examples is the Massachusetts law under which the state refused to
contract with businesses that themselves did business in Myanmar
(Burma) .17 That he uses such an example is symptomatic of another
feature of the modem constitutional order - the decay of consensus
on what matters in international affairs. Supporters of the claim
that international human rights matter a great deal have significant
political leverage within the Democratic party, and rather less in
the Republican party.. Similarly, the parties seem to disagree
12. Martin S. Flaherty, History Right? Historical Scholarship, Original
Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law ofthe Land," 99 COLUM. L. REv.
2095, 2095-96 (1999).
13. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign
Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1395, 1409 (1999) (asserting that "[t]he
Court's traditional rule-like approach to the judicial foreign relations doctrines
might have seemed unsatisfactory because any errors of under- or overinclusiveness were thought to be unacceptably costly in the Cold War world").
14. Flaherty. supra note 12, at 2096.
15. See Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1089, 1105 (1999) ("The end ofthe Cold War era also is a'likely
factor in the shift away from foreIgn affairs exceptionalism, since there is now
a reduced need for the national government to speak with one voice in
international relations, and because many of the exceptionalism decisions . . .
clearly seem to be a product of the Cold War era."). See also Peter J. Spiro,
Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223, 1241-46 (1999)
(describing the historical Cold War context in which foreign affairs doctrine was
shaped).
16. Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1412.
17. See id. The Massachusetts law was held preempted by federal legislation
in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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systematically about the appropriate role in U.S. foreign policy of
a generalized concern for human rights. IS
In addition to these political elements, the institutional
environment of modem intemationallaw differs in several ways
from the institutional environment associated with the foreign
affairs policy-making process during the New Deal-Great Society
constitutional order. The participants in intemationallaw-making
differ. Traditional intemationallaw involved the direct creation of
binding rules in bilateral or multilateral treaties, while modem
international law establishes free-standing law-making institutions
to generate norms. 19 Domestically, the process of participating in
international law-making differs as well. Historically, wnat mi~ht
be called ordinary interest groups, typically oriented to achiev10g
material goals, were the major interest group participants in the
domestic processes that fed into treaty-maKing.20 Now nongovernmental organizations with ideological coIlltn.ltments, interest
groups, to be sure, but of a different sort, are important participants
10 die process, and some of these organizations operate across
national borders.
These new features of the constitutional order suggest that the
contours of constitutional doctrine might change as well. The
Massachusetts Burma Law case may provlde a hint of such changes.
One doctrine associated with the New Deal-Great Society: order
was a strong presumption that the national power over foreign
affairs preempted state legislation, even when Congress had not 10
fact directly exercised its power and even when the state legislation
was not obviously incompatible with what Congress had in fact
done.21 The Supreme Court might have decided the Burma Law
18. For example, the 2000 Democratic National Platform, available at
Qast
visited Mar. 1, 2001), "demand[s]" that "Congress pass the Convention to
Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women," and asserts that "[w ]e
will continue to press for human rights, tlie rule of law, and political freedom."
The
2000
Republican platform, available at
< http://www.rnc.orgI2000/2000platform8 > Qast visited Mar. 1, 2001),
criticlzes the Clinton aOministration's humanitarian interventions and mentions
human rights in connection with Cuba, Chechnya, and Iran.
19. For a collection of essays on Traditional and Contemporary
International Law, see INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY
READINGS (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998).
20. Here I have in mind the interest groups associated with the negotiation
of tax treaties and in litigation over the constltutionality of state taxes affecting
corporations operating transnationally.
21. The strongest case supponingthis presumption is Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429 (1968).

< http://www.democrats.org/hq/resources/platformlplatform.html>
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case by invoking this presumption. It did not. Instead, it adopted
what appears to be a studiously neutral stance, applying ordinary
principles of statutory interpretation with no concession in its
lDterpretive aIWroacli to the fact that the state law implicated
foreign affairs.
A political scientist might think that the Court's neutral
aRproach resulted in part from some relatively novel characteristics
of the Burma Law. State efforts to influence other nations'
governments through their purchasing activities are a rather recent
development. Perhaps more important, the Burma Law was the
product of a new policy-making process, in which transnational
non-governmental organizations have come to act in the way
traditional interest groups did.23 These transnational NGOs differ
from most traditional interest groups. Typically, the latter have
some direct material interest in the legislation they seek,24 while
transnational N GOs typically assert only moral interests.25 Perhaps
the New Deal-Great Society presumption in favor of preemption
made sense to a Court accustomed to assessing legislation emerging
from a policy-making process dominated by the traditional interest
groups that were an integral part of that order. The new
constitutional order might be SKeptical about that process and
adopt a state-favoring !'resumption against preemption. But, the
new policy-making enVIronment may have left the Court in a more
neutral interpretive position.
Accordiri~ to Koh, international norms become sources of
domestic law, 6 but, as I have indicated, they are only one among
22. For my analysis of the case, see Mark Tushnet, Globalization and
Federalism in a Post Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11 (2000). I should note,
however, that other scholars believe that what the Court did was actually
inconsistent with its avowedly neutral interpretive stance. I believe that those
scholars have not yet made their case, largely because to do so would require
comparing the Court's performance in the BurmaLaw case with its performance
in other preemption cases not involving foreign affairs, a task that these scholars
have not yet undertaken.
23. But see Koh, supra note 7, at 647 (describing the role of transnational
NGOs in the antislavery movement of the 1800s).
24. Of course they may also have moral interests, and almost always press
their policies on public interest grounds. Nonetheless, the element of material
interest is so common as to be a structural feature of traditional interest group
lobbying.
25. Again, this is not to contend that transnational NGOs do not have, or
at least are not supported by groups that have, material interests Qabor unions
supporting international human nghts claims about working conditions being
the obvious example), but only that the place of material interest is substantially
smaller than in tr3.ditional interest groups.
26. See Koh, supra note 7.
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many such sources. They must be integrated into domestic
constitutional law, harmonized with other doctrines. The New
Deal-Great Society constitutional order harmonized foreign affairs
to other J:!rovisions by giving foreign affairs primacy.27 Ordinarilyforeign affairs policies miglit express the United States' nationcil
interest narrowly understood. Sometimes, however, those policies
would adopt international norms. Even then the New Deal-Great
Society constitutional order gave them primacy. The new
constitutional order may treat international norms as on roughly
the same plane as other sources of law.28 The project of integration
would then become more complex. The next Section describes a
few areas in which U.S. constitutional law will have to engage in
that project.
ffi. FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

The project of integrating international legal norms and
domestic constitutional law may be a large one once domestic
constitutional law is not automatically subordinated to
international norms.29 On some interpretations, the North
27. Critics refer, somewhat pejoratively I think, to "foreign affairs
exceptionalism." See, e.g., Bradley, sUp!a note 15, at 1104. Peter Spiro pointed out
to me that the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order gave primacy to
foreign affairs primarily, if not exclusively, with respect to policy concerns
rather than constitutional ones.
28. See Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1399, uses the term "unders(>ecification"
to refer to the problems tnat arise when a norm. must be integrated lOto existing
law, without clear guidance from the norm itself as to its place in domestic law.
Goldsmith continues, "[E]ven if federal law is underspecified [that is, when
integration is necessary] ..• , such controversy is no more serious than analogous
controversies that arise all the time from underspecification of federal law in
domestic contexts." Id.
29. I must express the discomfort I felt as a domestic constitutionalla'\YYer
reading arguments about the incotp:>ration and integration of international legal
norms into domestic constitutional law. The predominant view appears to be
that the analytic work is completed upon establishin~ that some particular norm
is in fact a norm of international. law, sometImes on tlie ~ound that
international legal norms by definition override contr~ domestIC ones. That
would be true as well if the domestic processes by whIch international legal
norms were integrated into domestic law made them hierarchically superior to
other sources of domestic law. Such superiority may have (contlO~ently)
characterized the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order. But, plalOly, it
is not a necessary characteristic of the relation between international norms and
constitutional law, including the constitutional law of federalism. It may be that
the international legal norm prevails because it can be integrated into domestic
constitutional law without alteration, but today establishing that proposition
takes some arguments drawn from domestic constitutional law.
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American Free Trade Agreement authorizes determination of
binding domestic law by an appellate body whose members do not
have die guarantees of tenure required by Article llI.30 Some have
contendea that the treaty banmng the production of biological
wea~ns authorizes searches within the United States that do not
satis the Fourth Amendment's reguirements.31
wo episodes involving the deadi penalty offer the opportunity
to examine the integration of international human riglits norms
with the domestic constitutional law of federalism. The first is the
celebrated Breard litigation.32 Breard was a national of Paraguay
who was convicted In a Virginia court of capital murder and
sentenced to death.33 The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations provides that foreign citizens detained by officials in
another nation must be informed promptly of their right to contact
their embassy.34 Breard did not receive that information.35 After his
conviction Breard filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court,
arguing that the failure to comply with the Vienna Convention's
requirements entitled him to relief from his conviction.36 In
addition, Paraguay filed suit in the federal district court and in the
Supreme Court against various Virginia officials, seeking an
injunction against the execution.37 And, finally, Paraguay filed an
action against the United States in the International Court of
Justice, which promptly issued an order directing the United States
to ~take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco
Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these
30. For contrasting views, see Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Constitutional
Dimensions o/the NorthAmericanFree Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELLINT'LL.J.

141 {1994} (arguing that the NAFTA dis~ute resolution violates Article Ill), and
Justin Senior, Comment, The Constituttonality of NAFTA's Dispute Resolution
Process, 9 FLA. J .INT'L L. 209 (1994) (arguing that the dispute resolution process
is constitutional). See also A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts andAmerican
Courts, 21 MICHJ.lNT'LL. 877, 892-900 (2000) (discussing Article ill Eroblems
that might arise from a treaty authorizing international review of decisions by
U.S. courts).
31. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Problems with Enforcing the
Biological Weapons Convention, 61 CATO INST. FOREIGNPOL'yBRIEFING 1,3·8
(Sept. 28, 2000).
32. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). Weisburd, supra note 30, at
879 no.7-8, provides citations to the major academtc commentaries on the Breard
litigation.
33. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 373.
34. Seeid
35. See id
36. See id
37. See id
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proceedings. "38
All the suits failed. Breard's habeas corpus suit was rejected
because he had failed to present his claim under the Vienna
Convention to the state courts in an appropriate manner.39
Pa~y:'s suits failed because a foreign nation IS not a "person"
entitled by the relevant federal statute to sue state officials for
constitutional violations,.fO because the Convention did not clearly
provide a private right of action in which a nation could vacate a
conviction,41 and perhaps because the Eleventh Amendment barred
suits against the state officials.42 Responding to the International
Court ofJustice's order of provisional measures, the U.S. Secretary
of State wrote a letter requesting that Virginia's governor delay
Breard's execution.43 The u.S. Department of Justice took the
position in its briefs to the Supreme Court that such a request was
the only "measure at its disposal" under u.S. constitutionallaw.#
The u.s. Supreme Court, after citing that letter, concluded, "H the
Governor wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his
prerogative. But nothing in our existing case law allows us to make
that choice for him. "45
Virginia was also involved in the other case on which I focus.
Jens Soering and his girlfriend conspired to kill her parents.46 He
fled to Europe.47 Responding to a request for extradition, Soering
obtained a ruling from the European Court of Human Rights that
Virginia'S method of administering the death penalty was "cruel,
inhuman, [or] degrading treatment" in violation of the Euro1?ean
Convention on Human Rights,48 with the result that the BrItish
government could not comply with both the extradition request
38.Id. at 374 (~oting Order on Request for the Indication of Provisional
Measures, 1998I.C.J. Reports 248 (Apr. 9,1998), from Concerning the Vienna
Convention of Consular Relations (paraguay v. U.S.), 1998 I.e.]. Pleadings 91
(Oct. 9, 1998}).
39. See U1. at 375.
40. See id. at 378.
41. See id. at 377.
42. Seeid.
43. See id. at 378.
44. As the government brief put it, "our federal system imposes limits on the
federal government's ability to interfere with the criminal justice systems of the
States. The 'measures at [the United States'] disposal' under our Constitution
ma}" in some cases include only persuasion." Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-8214).
45. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
46. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 439 (1989).
47. Seeid.
48. 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), pp. 439, 478, P111 (1989).
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and the European Convention. The u.s. sovernment then
represented to the United Kingdom that Soermg would not be
prosecuted for capital murder in Virgip.ia.49 Soering was then
extradited and was prosecuted without facing the risk of capital
punishment.50
Breard and Soering raise questions about the integration of
international human rights norms and u.s. federalism. In
panicular, the cases implicate the two dimensions of the new
constitutional order's federalism doctrine. 51 The first dimension is
a restriction on the subject-matter scope of congressional power; the
second is a restriction on the methods Congress may use to carry
out policies otherwise authorized by the Constitution. The Court
has operated along the first dimension in invalidating the Gun-Free
School Zones Act,52 the civil1iabi1i~ provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act,53 and the ReligIOUS Freedom Restoration
Act.54 In each case the Court held that the Constitution allows
Congress to act only when it can properly invoke one of the
powers enumerated m the C~>nstitution, and that the power to
regulate commerce among the several states or to implement the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive guarantees did not extend to
the statutes in question. 55 The Court has operated along the second
dimension in defining the "anti-commandeering" principle,
according to which Congress may not direct state legislative
officials to enact or state executive officials to enforce legislation
conforming to Congress's specifications.56
49. For a description of the U.S. government's representations, see Sanja
Djajic, The Effect ofInternational Court ofjustice Decisions on Municipal Courts In
the United States: Breard v. Greene, 23 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 27, 7980 (1999).
50. The U.S. Supreme Court has regu!arly denied review of claims that longterm detention on death row awaiting execution violates the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. For the most recent case,
see Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999), with separate opinions by Justices
Thomas and Breyer.
51. A third set of cases involving federalism limits the remedies available for
violations of substantive norms otherwise properly imEosed on the states. These
are the so-called Eleventh Amendment cases. Notably, these cases do not
implicate the substantive scope of the national government's power, which is my
concern here.
52. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
53. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000).
54. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
55. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 567-68; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607, 618-19; City
ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
56. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-26 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). See also infra note 99.
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Breard and Soering indicate the ways in which a national
obligation assumed unCler a treaty may have adverse effects on a
state's ability to prosecute ordinary crime, an interest that the
Court has occasionally invoked in e~laining its subject-matter
limitations on congressional power.5 In addition, the Vienna
Convention a,llpears to impose an obligation on state police officials
to comply With a directIve from die national government, an
obligation that is in apparent tension with the anti-commandeering
principle.58
Tlie Breard litigation was rushed, and reached the Supreme
Court in an extremely awkward procedural posture.59 In addition,
Breard's argument that Virginia's failure to comply with the
Vienna Convention entitled liim to relief from his conviction may
well have been flawed on the merits.60 More interesting than
Breard's personal claims are possible responses to the ICl's Order
of ProvisIOnal Measures.61 Tlie ICI ordered the U.S. government to
"take all measures at its disposal. "62 What measures were at the
national government's disposal? In particular, could the U.S.
government direct that VirgInia forgo its prosecution because of the
state's failure to comply with die Convention? To focus the
discussion, suppose that Con~ess enacted a statute implementing
the Convention with two basiC elements. First, Congress directs all
state police officials to ask the persons who they arrest whether
they are forei~ nationals and then to inform immediately those
who are, of tlieir rights under the Vienna Convention.63 Second,
57. See, e~g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 927-28 (describing the diversion of
investigative efforts from felony cases to background checKs).
58. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963 (1970),21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
60. The Convention could be read to provide a right to notice but not that
the remedy for violating that right is the invalidity of any conviction later
obtained.
61. Order on Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1998 I.C.].
Reports 248 (Apr. 9, 1998) from Concerning the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (paraguayv. United States), 1998I.C.J. Pleadings 91 (Oct. 9,
1998).
62. Order of Provisional Measures, 1998 I.C.J. Reports at 258.
63. After the Breard litigation concluded, the U.S. government apologized
to the government of Paraguay and distributed information about die Vienna
Convention's requirement to police agencies throughout the country-. For the
former, see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-8214); for the latter, see Marion Nash, Contemporary
Practiceo/the U.S. Relating to International Law, 92 AM.J.lNT'LL. 243, 243-45
(1998) (quotin,g Consular Notification andAccess: Instruction for Federal, State, and
LocafLaw EnJorcementand Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the U.S.
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Congress provides that no person entitled to such information can
be prosecuted if the information was not given, and that
convictions obtained when the information was not given are void.
Would such a statute be constitutional? Similarly, one can ask
where the national government gets the authority to represent to
foreign nations that state governments will not invoke their
ordiriary criminal processes, including the option of the death
penalty.64
IV. FEDERALISM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

A. A Framework for Evaluating the Needfor Constitutional Doctrine
Much existing discussion of u.S. federalism and international
human rights proceeds by hypothesizing that the United States has
entered into some internatIOnal agreement that requires national
and the Rights of Consular Officials to Assist Them, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB.
No. 10518 (1998».
64. The doctrine of speciality permits post-extradition limitations on the
power to prosecute. Most reported specialty cases appear to involve limitations
on the power of the U.S. government to prosecute after extradition, but state
courts assume that they must enforce limitations pursuant to representations by
the u.S. government. See, e.g., Washington v. Pang, 940 P.2d 1293 (Wash. 1997)
(addressing the :proper interpretation 01 the doctrine of specialty while assuming
its applicability). I note as well that it seems to be assumed that the doctrine
applies to liiriitations on post-extradition punishment, or at least to
representations that the death penalty will not be invoked. Additionally, a
federal statute provides: "Whenever any person is delivered by any foreign
government to an agent of the United States, for the purpose of being brou~t
within the United States and tried for any offense of whIch he is duly accused,
the President shall have power to take
necessary measures .... for [the
accused person's] security against lawless violence." 18 U.S.C. § 3192 {1994}.
Although the context clearly suggests a concern for protecting against mob
violence, the term "lawless violence" might reasonably fie interpreted to refer to
a state government's refusal to comply with the doctrine of specialty. Carlos
Vazquez, Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, suggested
to me that the extradition of a particular individual after a representation by the
United States that triggers the doctrine of specialty might be regarded as an
executive agreement made pursuant to the overarching extradition treaty, and as
an executive agreement, it would bar states from acting in a manner inconsistent
with the agreement under United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), and
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). Finally, the doctrine of specialty is
available as a defense to a criminal prosecution, and is therefore applied by state
courts. According to the Supreme Court, the anti-commandeering principle does
not bar the national government from imposin~.obligations on state judges. See
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 178·79 (distinguishing Testa v. Katt, 330
U.S. 386 (1947».

all
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action that intrudes on matters of state concern, whether by taking
over a subject-matter ordinari!y regulated by state governments or
by commandeering state officials. For example, authors ask
whether the U.S. Constitution would preclude the nation from
entering into an international agreement to ban the imposition of
death sentences on those who were juveniles when they committed
their crimes. But, proceeding by hypothetical may be particularly
misleading today, in the new constitutional order because such
agreements are exceedingly: unlikely to be adopted.
I begin with what should be obvious: Over the past generation
the treaty-makers have been quite reluctant to endorse eXEansive
exercises of the treaty power. They have routinely aaded a
"federalism" declaration to international agreements dealing with
human rights, and sometimes have expressly disclaimed the
applicabili~ of particular treaty j>rovisions.65 If anything, this
practice is likely to strengthen in the new constitutional order.
The political ori~s of these "federalism" limitations are
reasonably clear. The basic features of the national governing
process over the past generation have been divided government and
Increasingly hostile divisions between the Democratic and
Republican parties. Acceding to the international agreements in
question has been a priority of the human rights and
internationalist wings of the Democratic party.66 They picked up
65. For a recent discussion and defense of the practice of making federalism
and more specific reservations to U.S. ratification of international treaties, see
Curtis A. Bradley &Jack 1. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399 (2000). On a techniCal level, federalism
declarations mi~ht not preclude Congress from enacting constitutionally
questionable legtslation and may not be judicially enforceable. But, more
important, the federalism declarations tYEically state that the national
~overnment will implement the treaty to which the declaration is attached only
m areas of traditional national auihori9!. Thus, on a political level, the
government could defend any treaty-based legislation on the ground that it did
not go beyond the sco~e of traditional national authority. Nonetheless, a Senate
insistent enough on federalism to require that a federalism declaration be
attached to a treaty is unlikely to approve treaty-based legislation raising
federalism concerns.
66. For example, the Carter administration submitted five international
human rights agreements to the Senate (the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights [hereinafter Covenant on Civil and Political Ri~tsD, the
International Covenant on Economic. Social. and Cultural Rights, the
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)); the
Reagan administration submitted two (the Genocide Convention and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
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some support from the residual internationalist wing of the
Republican party, but Republicans have been significantly more
skeptical of international institutions than Democrats. Treaties
require agreement from two-thirds of the Senate, a level that cannot
be reached without substantial bipartisan support in a Senate that
has become increasingly divided along partisan lines even on
foreign affairs issues. The federalism declarations are the price
Democrats have to ~ay to obtain enough votes from Republicans
to adopt the treaties. 7 Even sharper divisions are present in the new
constitutional order, making it quite unlikely that the United States
will enter into treaties or international agreements raising serious
federalism questions. 68
New, problematic agreements may be rare. But what of existing
agreements? Some agreements made during the New Deal-Great
Society constitutional order might raise questions that were not
taken seriously at the time they were entered, but would be taken
seriously in the new constitutional order.69 This could occur in two
ways. First, the existing agreements might be interpreted
expansively. The Supreme Court's actions in the Breard litigation
suggest that the Court is unlikely to provide such interpretations.
Its opinion was shot through with skepticism about the claim that
the Vienna Convention should be interpreted to provide any of the
many grounds for relief Paraguay and Breard found in the
Convention.7° Nor is it likely tliat today's Congress would seize
uRon an existin~ treaty as the basis for legislation it could not
otherwise enact. 1 Second, the existing agreements might be
Treatment or Punishment [hereinafter Torture Convention]; the Bush
administration submitted two (the Torture Convention and the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights); the Clinton administration submitted two (CERD
andCEDAW).
67. The same dynamic occurs in connection with ordinary legislation, where
the requirement of support in both houses of Congress replaces the requirement
of two-thirds support m the Senate.
68. Treaty proponents may be able to move some treaties forward by
gaining agreement from some states to accept the treaty's requirements and
agreement from the negotiating I>artners that application of the treaty's
requirements everywhere in the United States is unnecessary. (I am grateful to
my colleague John Jackson for pointing out this possibility to me).
69. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 75 (distinguishing between the Supreme
Court's willingness to aggressively review old statutes and Congress' reluctance
to enact new ones).
70. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1998).
71. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 33,50-51 (1997) (suggesting that the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights might be a source of con&ressional authority to enact the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA». For the Congressional response to the
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unambigt!ous.72 The Vienna Convention, for example, really does
command state police officials to take particular actions; the
ambiguities the Court found in the Convention went to remedy,
not to the underlying obligation?3 As we will see, however, the
unambiguous agreements raising serious federalism question have
a rather strong pedigree. The Court could enforce federalism
limitations only oy engaging in a revolutionary transformation of
constitutional doctrine. But it need not do so. The existing
agreements that unambiguously raise federalism questions are, I
believe, rather few in number and these exceptional cases can be
preserved without threatening any serious federalism concerns the
Court might have in the new constitutional order.74
In the new constitutional order, then, the Supreme Court is not
likely to have any need to develop constitutioncil doctrines dealing
with power to regulate international affairs that limit national
power in the name of federalism. Modesty, not revolution, is the
order of the day.

B. Federalism Limitations on the Power Over Foreign Affairs
Applying subject-matter limitations and the anticommanaeering principle in the context of international relations
is likely to prove quite difficult. A subject-matter limitation
Supreme Court's invalidation of the RFRA, relyin& on the commerce and
spending powers, see Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000, PuD. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803.
72. Again, coming to the matter as an outsider, I was struck by the existence
of interyretive ambi~ty with respect to the doctrine of specialty in Soering,
both WIth respect to Its application to state-level prosecutions and with respect
to representations about the ap,t>lication of the oeath ,t>enalty. If interpretive
ambisuity exists there, unambIguous provisions raismg serious federalism
questions must be exceedingly rare.
73. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
74. Carlos V~uez has pointed out that many existing treaties have
aspirational I?rovisions that, while not enforceable without supporting
legislation, mtght be invoked to justify legislation not otherwise within an
enumerated power. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty
Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1317, 1339 n.75 {1999}. He also points out that the
trea~ that was the basis for upholding the statute in question in Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), provided that the United States would propose
appropriate legislation, not tIlat it would enact such legislation. Vazquez suggests
iliat Holland might be limited by denying Congress the power to enact statutes
based on such precatory provisions. I wonder, liowever, whether this makes too
much of the difference between an obligation assumed by the national
government to propose legislation and an ooligation to enact it: Why would a
treaty partner accept the former without believing that it entailed the latter?
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appropriate to the context of international relations would have to
accommodate two concerns: the national interest in conducting
international affairs, and federalism. The Court's federalism
doctrine provides only hints at what such an accommodation might
look like. Those hints suggest that the accommodation might place
. in doubt national actions that go back to the early Republic.
Applying the anti-commandeering principle to international affairs
woUld have similar effects. The Court has supported the anticommandeering principle by pointing out that Congress has only
recentlrs attempted to direct state officials to enforce national
policy. 5 That argument seems unavailable with respect to national
power over international affairs. Finally, the Court's articulation
of the anti-commandeering principle aIlows a number of escape
hatches, some of which are rather clearly applicable to the Breard
and Soering litigation.

1. Subject-Matter Limitations
The Court has confronted the issue of subject-matter limitations
in connection with two discrete grants of power to Congress, the
Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The doctrine emerging from the Commerce Clause opinions is that
Congress has power to regulate commercial activities that, in the
aggregate, have a substantial. effect on interstate commerce, but may
not refIlate non-commercial activities having the same aggregate
effect. The Court's rationale for the rustinction between
commercial and non-commercial activities is that some line must be
drawn to ensure that the commerce power does not give Congress
plen!uy authority to regulate whatever a majority decides to
regulate,77 and that the language of the Commerce Clause supports
drawing the line between commercial and non-commercial
activities.78 The Section Five decisions hold that Congress may
enact legislation enforcing the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment's first section to the extent that the legislation is a
proportionate response to demonstrated violations of those
75. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 917-18 ~997).
76. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000 .
77. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denmn~, ower Court Readings
of Lopez, or What If the Supreme Court Held a Constztutional Revolution aiid
NobotJy Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 369, 378 (2000), describing this as the "noninftnity principle," that "anr justification for congressional power must not be
one that would undermine the very notion of enumerated powers."
78. See Board of Trustees ofthe Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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~tees.79

These rules are of course tied to the particular constitutional
provisions at issue. The Commerce Clause opinions, however, have
another theme. The Court explained the importance of interpreting
constitutional provisions as placing limits on Congress's Eowers by
emphasizing that more expansive interpretations would license
Congress to act in areas traditionally re~lated primarily by the
state. Those areas include education, ordfuary crone, and land use
control.80 This suggests that the Court ml~ht be interested in
develo'pin~ a suoject-matter limitation directed not at the
ConstitutIOn's enumerations of power, but rather at what used to
be called the reserved powers of state governments.
These two approaches to subject-matter limitations will be
difficult to develop in the context of Congress's power in
international affairs. One problem is that the Court's federalism
decisions have been concerned with what it characterized as
innovative exercises of congressional power. For example, it used
the fact that Con~ess had only recently begun to commandeer state
executive officials in support of the anti-commandeering rule.81 But,
treaties in which the u.s. government agreed to legal rules that,
according to contemEoraneous understandin~s, It could not
otherwise enact go back to the early Republic. Even more, the
Constitution unambiguously gives Congress the power to "define
and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations,,,83 some of
which might be the subject of ordinary state criminal law. Professor
David Golove notes early treaties overriding state laws barring
aliens from owning real property, which might fall within the
present Court's area of "land use regulation," despite the fact that
79. See cases cited supra note 78.
80. On education, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (criticizing
the implication of alternative views that woUld allow Congress to "mandate a
federal curriculum for local elemen~ and secondary schools"); on ordinary
crime, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (noting that alternative views would allow
Congress to regulate murder); on land use control, see Solid Waste Agency v.
Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675, 684 (2001) (referring to the states'
"traditional and primary power over land and water use").
81. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 917-18.
82. See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Forei~ Affairs: Congress' Power to
"Define and Punish . .. Offenses Against the Law oJ Nattons," 42 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 447 (2000).
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 10. See generally David M. Golove, Treaty-

Making and the Nation: The Historical Foutiilations ofthe Nationalist Conception
ofthe Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1149-1210 (2000) (describing treaties
entered into during the early Republic and ante bellum periods, as well as
contemporaneous political and academic commentary).
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no one at the time thought that Congress had a general power,
independent of its trea~-making power, to prescribe rules of real
property law applica6le in the states. 84 Professor A. Mark
Welsburd, describmg treaties upheld by the Supreme Court that
overrode state laws regulating inheritance of lands by aliens,
suggests that "regulation of ... those subjects would even today be
difficult to bring within the powers of Congress described in
Article I of the Constitution."8
What shal?e might a doctrine limiting the Treaty Power take?8&
One might tnmk tliat just as regulation premised on the Commerce
Clause must target truly commercial activities, so regulation
premised on the Treaty Power or other international affairs powers
must target subjects trUly appropriate for international agreement. 87
The problem with this suggestion is that it is quite aifficult to
identity subject that are not appropriate for international
agreement.
The difficulty comes in two forms. First, in a globalized world
the line between domestic matters and international ones is
increasingly difficult to draw-far more difficult than drawing the
84. See Golove, supra note 83, at 1157-88 (describing the controversy over
the Jay TreaD' between the United States and Great Britain, which contained a
provision allowing British subjects to own real property in the states, thus
overriding the common law rule allowing forfeiture of real property owned by
aliens). I note that the federal courts followed state common law on real
l'rope!"tY even during the era of Swift v. Tyson. See, e.g. , Jackson v. Chew, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 153 (1827).
85. Weisburd, supra note 30, at 900 {discussing Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2
Wheat.) 259 (1817), and Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879».
86. The suggestion that federalism llinitations are conceptuaBy inappropriate
with respect to forei~ affairs rattles around in the literature. Relying on United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), these autliors suggest
that power over foreign iffairs was never lodged in the states, which therefore
could not "reserve" any aspect of foreign affairs power from the Constitution's
delegations to the national government. See, e.g., Chad Thornberry, Comment,
Fediralism vs. Foreign Affairs: How the United States Can Administer Article 36 of
the Vtenna Convention on Consular Relations Within the States, 31 MCGEORGE
L. REv. 107, 139 (1999); Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good
Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1726, 1748-50 (1998).
The argument could be supplemented by observing that the Court adopted a
related view in U.S. Term Ltmits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). But, as one
author observes, "One objection to this position is that it ... leaves the treaty
power virtually unlimited. " Healy, supra, at 1750. If accepted, it would terminate
the inquiry in which I am engaged here. In addition, adopting the position would
be an aggressive assertion of national authority, in an era when the doctrinal
trend is in the other direction.
87. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 140-41
(1972) (describing cases supporting such a limitation).
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line between commercial and non-commercial activities. 88 As
Pro~essor .Ta~k G<?ldsmith puts it, the difficulty of identifying u.s.
foreIgn relatIons mterests
is exacerbated by the waning of the distinction between
domestic and foreign affairs. . . . In truth there is no
definitive way of diVining the U.S. foreign relations interest
in a particular context or the manner in which this interest
would be best accommodated. The Constitution gives these
tasks l'rimarily to the political branches that have the
expertIse and structure to perform them relatively well.89
Second, and probably more important, determining what is a
matter for international agreement IS not a unilateral deCISion made
by the United States; it is a bilateral or multilateral one made in
negotiations with other nations not necessarily concerned about
U.S. domestic arrangements. So, for example, U.S. negotiators
could come to the taole with proposals that, m u.s. constItutional
terms, might deal solely with matters that are uncontroversially
within the sC0l'e of the Treaty Power, such as international trade
or the internatIonal rendition of fugitives from prosecution by the
United States. The negotiating partners might see this as an
occasion for raising other issues. For example, they might take the
position that they will agree to extradite those charged with federal
money-laundering offenses only if the United States agrees to
prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders charged in both federal
and state courts.90 The U.S. treaty-makers-the President and the
Senate-might agree to this proposal because they think the trade-off
88. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 451-52 ("Today, almost any issue can
plausibly be labelea "international."). Bradley continues, "[E]ven if there were
a workable distinction in theory between international and domestic matters, it
seems unlikely that u.s. courts would feel competent to contradict the political
branches on this issue. It is far from clear, for example, what standard tne courts
could use to draw such a line." Id. at 453.
89. Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1416.
90. The national government clearly has the power to eliminate the juvenile
death penalty in federal prosecutions, and has done so. 18 U.S.C. § 3591{a)
(1994). In the unlikely event that a negotiating partner insisted only that the
juvenile death penalty be eliminated in state prosecutions, the federal negotiators
might be more willing to concede than if they themselves had to forgo executing
juvenile offenders. We might develop a doctrine that treaty provisions must deal
even-handedly with the state and national governments, although I am skeptical
about the possibility of developing a useful standard for determining when a
provision operates in an even-handed way, and more skeptical about the need for
a doctrine to guard against what seems to me a quite remote possibility.
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is worth it. Standing alone, the ban on the execution of juvenile
offenders might not be a matter appropriate for international
agreement, but the extradition issue clearly is.91 It is hard to
understand why U.S. negotiators' hands should be tied when they
see~ to ac~o~plish what all would concede are appropriate foreignpolley obJectIves.
The foregoing example suggests the difficulty with the other
approach to subject-matter limItations, carving out enclaves where
only the states may regulate. One can readily devise scenarios in
whIch the treaty-maKers can accomplish concededly national
objectives only by trading off some matters otherwise within the
control of the states. For example, in the middle of a trade
negotiation one of the trading partners says, "Well, we'll concede
to you and allow the chstribution in our country of
biotechnologically enhanced food products from the U.S., although
our people are going to be pretty upset about that. To offset their
concern, though, in exchange you've got to stop executing juvenile
offenders anywhere in the United States." As Professor Weisburd
puts it, the United States enters negotiations with other nations
"because it wants something from die other party or parties to the
treaty, not because it seeks to use the treaty as a mechanism for
domestic regulation," but "[d]omestic effects may be inevitable. "92
It is implausible to impute to the Framers, or to any reasonable
manner of constructing a national government, an interest in
creating a structure tnat bars the national government from
achieving national objectives in a manner that interferes with state
prerogatIves, when compelled to do so bY' its negotiatin~ partners.93
The preceding argument also responds to the Court s expressed
concern that constitutional doctrine must not authorize Congress
91. Mari Matsuda suggested in conversation that one could defend the
position that the treaty power had no subject-matter limits even in the absence
of explicit trade-offs. The U.S. treaty-makers could reasonably take the position
that their bargaining position in a range of negotiations is strengthened by a
perception among the negotiating partners that the United States is a law-abiding
nation that honors internationalliuman rights norms. On this argument, even
a free-standing treaty banning the death penalty for juvenile offenders would be
a Eermissible exercise of the treaty power because adopting such a treaty would
enhance the U.S. position in other negotiations about matters that
unquestionably deal with matters of international concern.
92. Weisburd, supra note 30, at 921.
93. Again, the bi- or multilateral nature of foreign affairs distinguishes these
negotiations from policy-making in a purely domestic context, where only
Congress and the President decide what policies to fursue. In the treaty context,
the U.S. treaty-makers initially decide on the nation s preferred policies, but they
then must respond to counter-proposals by other nations.
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to do whatever its members think is wise policy, without regard to
the source of their power to do good things. The Court's concern
arises from the perception that Congress may act on its own, to do
what it wants. The treaty context comes close to eliminating the
possibility of unilateral action by Congress or the treaty-makers:
national law-makers cannot do whatever they want, but only what
other nations require them to do in order to extract from those
other nations an agreement to do something in the U.S. national
interest. The bargaining context, that is, sets the limits on
Con~ess's unilateral action that the Court has sought through
constitutional doctrine in the purely domestic context.
Professor Curtis Bradley has suggested one final subject-matter
limitation. Under his proposal, Congress's power in international
affairs, and in particular the treaty power, would not be an
independent source of national authority.94 That is, no law could
survive a federalism-based challenge unless its defenders could
identify some source of congressional power other than the treaty
power that is sufficient to authorize the statute. Professor Bradley's
proposal is reminiscent of controversies in an earlier era over
whether the Spending Clause was an independent source of national
power, or wliether instead Congress could appropriate money to
achieve objectives determined only: by some other enumerated
power. The Supreme Court rejected tlie latter proposition,95 thus
avoiding the problem that the alternative interpretation would have
renderea the Spending Clause redundant. Redundancy is something
of a problem In connection with Professor Bradley's proposal as
well, because it would not authorize the national government to do
an~hing domestically that it could not do anyw:ay.96 Professor
Bradley points out, however, that his proposal would not make the
Treaty Power completely redundant, because it would authorize
the national government to enter into agreements that would bind
it internationally. Any breaches would be subject to international
sanction. Note, however, that Professor Bradley's proposal means
that the United States simply cannot comply with some provisions
in international agreements the Constitution allows it to make. It
is only a slight exaggeration to say that, under his proposal, the
nation woula be in Violation of its international obligations at the
moment it entered the agreement. Again, it is difficult to
understand why one would design a constitution having that shape.
A requirement that international agreements deal with matters
94. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 456.
95. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
96. Of course the procedures for adopting treatIes and statutes differ.
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truly appropriate for international agreement, or a rule that the
Treaty Power was not an independent source of domestic
authority, could act as a bar to what might be called sham treaties.
Such treaties are ~reements Fned \lp by the U.S. trea~-makers
simply to accomplish somethmg they could not accomplish under
any other power.97 One must imagme U.S. officials approaching
some foreign partner, saying, "Look, could you do us a favor? We
want to do something, (for example, regulate land use, or eliminate
the death penalty for juveniles) that the Supreme Court won't let
us do on our own. But if you sign on to an agreement that obligates
us to do it, then everythin~ would be hunky-dory under our
Constitution." Perhaps there IS a reason to construct constitutional
doctrine to guard ?gainst such a remote possibility.98 Doctrines,
though, have a tendency to expand beyond their rationales, and the
risk of doctrinal creep probably exceeds the risk that the United
States would negotiate sham treaties, in which case it would be
better not to create a doctrine whose sole function is to bar sham
treaties.99
In sum, it is quite hard to devise a reasonable subject-matter
97. Professor Golove, while criticizing the view that there are subject-matter
limits on the treaty power, agrees that sham treaties cannot be enforced
domestically against feoeralism objections. See Golove, supra note 83, at 1287
("[T]he l'urpose of a treaty cannot be to adopt domestic standards just because
the Presldent and Senate oelieve them to be laudable."). See also HENKIN, supra
note 87, at 143 ("A treaty ... must be a bonafide a$reement between states, not
a 'mock marriage', nor a unilateral act by the Umted States to which a foreign
government lenas itself as an accommodation....").
98. A somewhat more realistic possibility is a treaty whose domestic
implications are strongly favored by the U.S. nego~iators even though those
implications are otherwise beyond the national government's power. The
negotiators might then make larger concessions to the negotiating partners. A
doctrine responsive to this concern would have to allow U.S. negotiators to
agree to such provisions if they extracted "enough" in exchange, and pretty
clearly would not be an attractive one for courts to administer.
99. I note another difficulty with the concern for sham treaties. Why would
the negotiating partner simply 00 the U.S. treaty-makers a favor? They mi&ht see
the U.S. offer as an opportunity to extract something in exchange. And, If that
something is an appropriate subject for international agreement, such as a trade
concession, we woUld again be in the position of having an agreement part of
which is within the nation's power and part of which is (by hypothesis) not. As
argued above, such mixed agreements would almost certainly survive
constitutional scrutiny. For completeness, I note the possibility of a doctrine
condemning treaties as shams where the international coml'0nent in a mixed
agreement was simply a facade for the treaty's true goal. Agam, the possibilities
that the treaty-makers would enter such agreements, and that the courts would
be able reliably to identify them, are so small that developing a doctrine along
these lines seems inadvisable.
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limitation on Congress's power in the international domain. Even
in the new constitutional order, an agreement to eliminate the
juvenile death penalty should be upheld. loo The United States is
unlikely to enter into such an agreement.

2. The Anti-Commandeering Principle
There is an obvious objection to the main argument in the
preceding section. Suppose the negotiating partners demanded that
the u.S. government enact, not a law impermissible for federalism
reasons, but a law violating the First Amendment. IOI The New
Deal-Great Society order accepted the proposition that the forei~
affairs ~ower was limited by the Constitution's protections of
libe~. 02 But, ifthe United States can override federalism concerns
to achieve its foreign policy goals, why can it not override the Bill
of Rights for the same reason?
One answer may simply be that the New Deal-Great Society
constitutional order accepted a shary distinction between individual
liberties, enumerated in the Constitution, and what Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes called the "invisible radiation" of the Tenth
~men~eI}t.103 Another ~swer may be that the T~eaty Pow:e~ is
mdeed hffilted by federalism concerns, conceptualized' as ansmg
independent of the substantive scope of the Treaty Power.l04 The
issue then becomes one of identifYing an appropriate federalism
doctrine limiting, not just the Treao/ Power, but all enumerated
powers. At present the only: candidate for such a doctrine is the
anti-commandeering principle.
,
The Vienna Convention's reguirement that police officials
advise forei~ nationals of their riglits under the Convention seems
a strai~ht-forward example of commandeering pursuant to a
treaty. 5 Other treaties ffilght direct state officials to comply with
100. Should here is both predictive and normative.
101. For example, a law bringing the United States in line with the
international consensus that hate speecn should be illegal could possibly violate
the First Amendment (to the extent that such hate speech laws are
unconstitutional).
102. See HENKIN, suprfl note 87, at 254-66 (describing the liberty-based
limitations on the foreign affairs power).
103. See Missouri v. Holland; 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
104. One formulation is that subject-matter limitations identify internal
limits on each enumerated power, limits that are specific to each such power,
while individual-rights limitations are external to all the enumerated powers and
cut across them all.
105. See Vazquez, supra note 74, at 1339 (describing the Convention's
requirements as commandeering); Healy, supra note 86, at 1746 (same).
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international human rights norms in ways requiring that they act
rather than refrain from acting. l06 Similarly, treaties might require
that effective remedies be provided for violations of human rights.
Creating such remedies might require legislation. l07 Do these
possibilIties raise constitutional questions?
The Court's anti-commandeering decisions describe a quite
limited exception that might be applicable to the Vienna
Convention problem, though not to the others. The exception,
described by Justice O'Connor and not disclaimed by the Court,
would allow Congress to require state officials to compile
information and report that information to federal officials. lOS The
decisions do not provide a justification for this exception.109 The
Court asserted tnat it lacked the capacity to determine whether
congressional requirements were too burdensome,l1o so it cannot be
that information-compilation does not impose real burdens on state
officials. The most prominent functional reason the Court offered
106. I believe that there is an anal~ic problem lurking in the Court's
apparent distinction between im,permissible affirmative commandeering and
permissible negative commandeenngthrough preemption of state authority. For
a discussion, see Tushnet, supra note 22, at 27. For present purposes, however,
I accept the proposition that affirmative commandeering is impermissible but
preemption IS acceptable. But note Vazquez, supra note 74, at 1347-48, 1350, uses
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1923), which upheld a treaty provision (from the
Treaty on Commerce and NaVIgation, Feb. 21, 1911, U.S.-Japan, 37 Stat. 1504),
that effectively required the city to consider license applicatlOns from Japanese
citizens, to illustrate the proposition that "it is notoriously difficult to draw the
line between affirmative and negative obligations."
107. Accordin~ to the Supreme Court, the anti-commandeering principle
would not be implicated if the treaties required only that state courts -prOVIde
enhanced remedies within a general remedial framework already created by state
law. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 1778-79 (1992) (distin~hing
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), on the ground that the Supremacy Clause,
directed specifically at state judges, allows them to be "commandeered" to
enforce national law).
108. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Court "refrains from decicfuig whether •.. purely
ministerial" reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and locil
authorities pursuant to Its Commerce Clause powers are . . . invalid," and
referring to a federal law requiring reporting missmg children to the Department
of Justice).
109. The Court's analysis is expressly formalist, meaning in this context that
the Court does not provide functional justifications for l~e parts of its doctrine.
The information-compilation exception might be a formalist exception to a
formalist doctrine, in which case there is little to say about it. See also Tushnet,
supra note 22, at 30-32 (describing the Court's formalism and the way in which
it limits the possibilities of reasoned analysis of the doctrine's contours and
implications).
110. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932-33.
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for the anti-commandeering doctrine is that commandeering
diffuses political responsibility by making it unclear to citizens
whether they should complain to local officials or to their
representatives in Congress about some action they dislike.Ill
Commentators have questioned the cogency of this ~ment, 112
but perhaps it explains why Congress may require state officials to
compile iiiformation. The Court migJIt believe that few citizens are
likely to complain about state officials' efforts to obtain the
information Congress requires, or that Congress has asked state
officials merely to assemble in a form Congress requires
information they already have obtained for their own purposes. I
have my doubts about these factual propositions, but something
like them must underlie a functional explanation of the exception
to the anti-commandeering doctrine.
Perhaps Congress ml~ht reguire notification as well as
information-compilation.ll Notification is, in one sense, simply
information-compilation in reverse: Instead of asking someone for
information, the police officials provide information to that person.
And yet, the Court's functional concerns seem to come into play
here. Providing the required information might be burdensome,
particularly wilen the police officials must locate a consular official
who might be far away.1l4 Obviously the person receiving the
information is unlikely to complain. But what about the victims
and their families? Notifying a criminal suspect of his or her rights
is controversial when the notification is required by the Court's
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, because, critics think, it
interferes with the ability of the _government effectively to enforce
the criminal law. Might not notification required by a treaty be at
least as controversial? Describing the problem after a failure to
notify has occurred, one commentator observes that executive
offiCials face "a difficult decision ... -whether to adhere to an
international obligation that most of their constituents probably
111. See New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83.
112. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May
Congress Commandeer State O~ers to Implement Fidei-al Law?, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1001, 1068-74 (1995); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy 0/
Cooperative Federalism: Why StateAutonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty"
Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 824-31 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and
the Uses and Limits o/Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2180, 220005 (1998).
113. Of course an exception for notification could be an additional formalist
exception to a formalist doctrine.
114. See Thornberry, supra note 86, at 134-35 (describing the burdens
notification might impose).
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did not know of or understand, or whether to adhere to their
states' criminal justice concerns...."115 The public might well
project the same conflict back to the time when notification is
actually given. The ar~ment from diffusion of political
responsibility in controversial settinfis seems no less powelful here
than in the cases the Court decided. 6
Perhaps one might conceptualize a notification requirement
somewhat differently. As noted earlier, the Court's anticommandeering doctrine applies to efforts by Congress to
commandeer state legislative and executive officials, but die Court
allows Congress to commandeer state judicial officers. The doctrine
thus i~licates the separation of powers on the state level. Modern
separatlon-of-powers aoctrine has two competing_strands. 117 In one,
the three branches are sharply separated. According to this strand,
a notification requirement would clearly be imposed on state
executive officials, and would be subject to the anti-commandeering
requirement. In the other strandg however, the lines are blurred,
largely for functional reasons. ll This strand might support an
argument locatin~ the notification requirement somewhere on the
edges of the judiCial branch because notification is closely bound up
with criminal prosecutions heard by the courtS. 119
Once again history might justify some degree of
commandeenng pursuant to tlie Treaty Power. According to
Professor A. Mark Weisburd, "early treaties included topics that
apparently required action by local executive officials.,,120 One
115.Id. at 126-27. Thornberry notes that of course governors will take the
latter course, quoting then-Governor George W. Bush: "In general, I will uphold
the laws of the State of Texas, regardless of the nationality of the person
involved." [d.
116. I do not mean to claim that the argument is powerful or persuasive in
its original context, but only that it is no less powerful or persuasive in the
present one.
117. The classic discussion is Peter Strauss, Formal andFunctionalApproaches
to Separation o/Powers Questions: A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv.
488 (1987).
118. See Strauss, supra note 117.
119. Thornberry, supra note 86, at 142, suggests that the anticommandeering principle would be avoided in the Breard context by: requiring
a determination at every defendant's initial [judicial] hearing" of whetlier the
defendant is a foreign national, and requiring notification of forei~ nationals'
rights at that time; see also Vazquez, supra note 74, at 1326 n.30 (maKing the same
suggestion).
120. Weisburd, supra note 30, at 903. Professor Weisburd's prime example
is a convention concluded in 1788 (Im.rlementing a treaty made in 1778)
requiring a party's "officials competent to arrest deserters from the other
nation's merchant ships. As Professor Weisburd points out, one might
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might read the Court's anti-commandeering decisions to mean that
commandeering that lacks a decent historical pedigree is
impermissible, leaving open the possibility that long-established
forms of commandeering, such as consular notification, are
constitutionally permissible.
The Court has offered another, substantially more expansive
way of working around the anti-commandeering principle. 12l The
analysis is deceptively simple. Assume that Congress may preempt
state action, dlrecting the states to do nothing about a particular
problem. Then, according to the Court, Congress can restore
authority to the states on condition that they enact l~gislation
Con~ess wants or on condition that their executive officers do
something that Congress wants.
Professor Carlos Vazquez defends the Vienna Convention's
requirements by invoking the conditional preemQtion doctrine. 122
According to hun, the Convention says to state officials, "of course
you don't have to arrest foreign nationals, but if you do, you have
to notify them of their rights under the Convention. ,,123 Professor
Vazquez's argument is entirely compatible with the Coun's
articulated doctrine, but it has the effect of trivializing the antimistakenly think that the relevant "officials competent" would be officials of the
national government. But there were no such officials in 1788; the Constitution
had been completed but the national government was not yet organized. See id.
Professor Welsburd acknowledges die possibility that a duty imposed on state
officials in 1788 was transferred to federal officials when the national. government
was organized, but argues that doing so "would have required the establishment
of a substantial federal eolice force in a good many port cities," a requirement
that he correctly thinks Implausible to attribute to the Framers. [d. at 903 n.142.
121. See James A. Deeken, Note, A New Miranda for Foreign Nationals? The

Impact o/Federalism on International Treaties that Place Affirmative Obligations
on State Governments in the Wake of Printz v. Unitec{'States, 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 997, 1030 (1998) (arguing that a state's failure to notify foreign
nationals of their rights under the Vienna Convention might be said to interfere
with the purposes of the Convention). If this is a valid argument, then the
Convention would preempt something, but it is not entir~!y clear what: maybe
the state's prosecution or state rules immunizing police officers frem monetary
liabilitr for unlawful action. Deeken argues that the Convention itself does not
establiSh a rule requiring the exclusion of evidence acquired as a result of a failure
to comply with the Convention's notification requirement. [d. at 1036-38.
122. See Vazquez, supra note 74.
123. Id. at 1325. Tlie national government's power to deny state officials
authority to arrest or prosecute foreign nationals arises from its power over
government out not subforeign relations. Other nations might trust the
national governments, and might insist in negotiatIOns that only the U.S.
government prosecute their nationals, even for ordinary crimes. That possibility
IS sufficient to establish that the
government has the power to preempt the
application of state criminal laws to foreign nationals.

u.s.

u.s.
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commandeering rule. As Professor Vazquez points out, the statutes
the Court invahdated as commandeering state officials could readily
be re-cast-and even merely re-interpreted-as conditionally
preempting state law. 124 A broadly construed doctrine authorizing
commandeering by means of conditional ~reemption would make
the anti-commandeering principle one truly of form alone.
That said, the power to commandeer through conditional
preemption would seem expansive enough to encompass virtually
any imaginable international agreement that would effectively
require states to comply with international human rights norms.
Consider again the death penalty for juvenile offenders. Recall that
I have argued that it is nearly impossible to devise a doctrine that
would take some subject matter off the table for international
negotiation. H that argument is right, there can be no subject-matter
limitation barring the national government from regulating
ordinary crime. Pursuant to a treaty, then, Congress could enact a
statute making every capital crime committed by a juvenile in states
with the juvenile death penalty exclusively a federal offense,
punishable by something other than death. With the power to
preempt, Congress can then exercise the conditional-preemption
power and authorize states to prosecute juvenile offenders but only
on condition that they not be subject to capital punishment. 125
Perhaps the intuitIon behind the anti-commandeering principle
can be salvaged by transforming the Court's concern with the
diffusion of political responsibility. As Professor Weisburd puts it,
the early treaties «do not purport to brinij about Jundtimental
changes in state governmental structures." 26 As noted above,
Congress's self-serving purposes and impulse to aggrandize its
power at the expense of the states might be constrained at least a bit
m the treaty context. This is because the other nations with whom
the treaty-makers deal may have no interest in helping Congress
become more powerful. In this context, then, a rule more limited
than the anti-commandeering one might be defensible: the treatymakers cannot enter into agreements that would fundamentally
124. See Vazquez, supra note 74, at 1327-28 (suggestin~ a rewriting of the
Brady Act to invoke the power to preempt on condition); see also Janet R.
Carter, Note, Commandeering Undei- the Treaty Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 598,
618 (2001) (arguing that "finding such proposals to be within Con~ress's powers
would open the door to complete circumvention of states' rights ).
125. This example is a oit off-key, because barring states from executing
juvenile offenders is not precisely a form of affirmative commandeering. A better
example may be a requirement that states that prosecute juvenile offenders
confme them in prisons for a federally prescribed number of years.
126. See Weisburd, supra note 30, at 918 (emphasis added); see also HENKIN,
supra note 87, at 148 (describing a similar constraint).
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change state governments.
But, once again, we might wonder about the need for such a
doctrine in the modem era. The treaty-makers are hardly likely to
accede to requests from other nations that would have die effect of
wreaking such fundamental changes.
V. CONCLUSION
I have argued that the contours of federalism doctrines limiting
U.S. national power in the international arena are difficult to
define, and in any event address purely hYJ:?othetical problems that
are unlikely to be real matters ofpolicy-making concern in the new
constitutional order. However, were the Court to announce a
limiting doctrine, it might change the domestic playing field. It
would present proponents of incorporating internationaI human
rights norms into U.S. domestic law with another argument,
beyond the existing, essentially: policy-based ones, that they would
have to overcome. To do so, tney might well have to make some
concessions of their own, leading to the adoption of a treaty in a
different form from the one that would have been adopted were it
clear that the treao/-makers had plenary power. Resolving the
controversy over the existence of federalism limits on the treaty
power thus has consequences even in the new constitutional era.
The United States is unlikely to adopt the most expansive
international human rights proposals currently: on the international
agenda. It mig~t, however, agree to some modest proposals. Were
tEe treaty-making community: (academics, members of Congress,
executive branch officials, and Judges) to accept the proposition
that there are federalism limits on the treaty power, whatever the
United States adopts will be even more limited.
Weare in the early days of the new constitutional order. I have
argued that we can expect few bold initiatives from either the
treaty-makers or the courts in this new order. The Supreme Court
has articulated doctrines that might be developed m ways that
would work large changes in what the past generation assumed the
treaty-makers could do. We should expect, though, that the
doctrines will not be developed in such ways. Nor should we ex,pect
that the need will arise for the courts to invoke doctrines linuting
national power in the name of federalism. 127
127. In one sense this observation echoes Professor Thomas Franck's
pessimism about the incorporation of international norms into U.S. law and
policy, and offers some structural and political considerations supporting his
normative concerns. Thomas M. Franck, Dr. Pangloss Meets the Grinch: A
Pessimistic Comment on Harold Koh's Optimism, 35 Hous. L. REv. 683 (1998).
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